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I
What Is the Social Security
Problem?
Chapter J
An Overview of the Issues
Olivia S. Mitchell, RobertJ. Myers,
and Howard Young
The U.S. social security system has played a central role in improving the
well-being of older Americans since the Great Depression. Since the Old-
Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program was launched
during the Great Depression, millions of program participants have relied
on the orderly and timely functioning of the system. In 1997, the Social
Security Administration paid benefits of about $360 billion to retirees, their
dependents, and their survivors, while payroll taxes on workers and their
employers amounted to about $400 billion. At the end of 1997, the excess-
amoun ting to about 21 months ofbenefit payouts - was held in special issue
Treasury obligations in the social security trust funds. Currently the OASDI
program - which accounts for over a fifth of the federal budget - is hailed
by many as a model of efficiency, providing a valuable source of income to
approximately 44 million beneficiaries each month for an annual admin-
istrative cost of $3.7 billion, which represen ts $26 per covered wQrker. Cer-
tainly many of today's elderly would live in poverty if not for the social
security system, and older people in the United States today have reason to
feel more confident about their prospects in old age than do the elderly in
the most of the world's other nations.
Despite these accomplishments, Americans have begun to worry about
the future of their social security system. This is because, about the time the
baby boom retires, the social security system will face serious imbalance.
Specifically, payroll taxes along with interest income from the trust funds
will fall short of the income flow needed to pay benefits. The fund is insuffi-
cient to payoff the estimated large amount needed to prefund all promised
obligations, after taking into account future income from taxes and interest.
In addition, a growing group ofyoung people believes that it will not "get its
money's worth" from the system. These two realities have prompted the
most serious rethinking since 1939 of the basic principles on which social
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security is based. There is no immediate crisis, since projected system reve-
nues are projected to be adequate to pay promised benefits for about 20
years. But ideally well before the crisis does arrive, reforms must be imple-
mented for the social security system to continue to playa key role in Ameri-
cans' retirement.
The need for reform was powerfully brought to the public's attention
during the mid-1990's by the governmental-appointed Advisory Council on
Social Security (1994-1996). Reflecting a range of political views, agel
ethnic/sex interest groups, employer and employee organizations, and
geographic backgrounds, this 13-member group received testimony from
national experts and held numerous open meetings. But while previous
councils had been able to fashion compromises when required, this Ad-
visory Council issued a final report containing not one but three very differ-
ent reform plans (Advisory Council 1997). This lack of agreement brought
home to Americans the deep-seated nature of the con troversy, and the lack
of easy consensus.
In this volume we put this debate in context by explaining whyAmericans'
most important old-age support system faces the fundamental challenges
that it does as we enter the twenty-first century. We then offer a range of
perspectives on how to think about reform options going forward, and how
to compare some of the most important reform alternatives available. To-
ward this goal, we have collected the reasoned thoughts of some two dozen
influential social security experts, people who are united by their concern
for the nation's retirement system but who also frequently disagree about
what should be done about these problems. As will become clear, we do not
impose consensus on these experts, but instead take the opportunity to
present their views so as to stimulate additional thought, discussion, and
more informed policymaking. We believe that it is in hearing the many
different stakeholders' voices about social security that the lessons and pit-
falls become clearer.
Looking across these distinct views, several messages emerge. One is that
alternative reforms offer different ways to spread the risks of old age across
the stakeholders in the economy. Specific old-age risks confronting retirees
include individual risks- often attributable to low earnings or job loss pro-
ducing low retirement saving; company risk-arising from corporate finan-
cial duress; national risk-due to inflation and economic ,-ecession; and
international risk- arising in times ofglobal capital market fluctuations such
as the present.' Stakeholders in the retirement income system naturally
include individual workers and retirees, their families, and their employers;
moving to the broader view, one might include all members of a given gen-
eration, and also those from many different generations-including those
as yet unborn. How these four types ofold-age risk impinge on all the differ-
ent players is a topic we place at center stage in the discussions to follow.
Not only does the identity of stakeholders in the system vary; who they are
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also affects each group's assessment of costs and benefits and how they
judge the menu of reform options. For example, employers, workers, and
other groups including women and the poor, will tend to see very differently
the appropriateness of keeping the defined benefit approach vel'sus moving
to a defined contribution formal. Here we not only describe the alterna-
tives, but also offer criteria for judging them and for explaining why reason-
able people diller regarding their policy recommendations. We also assess
the most important implications of social security system-wide reform, and
explore what these changes might do to alter the basic fabric of the eco-
nomic and social environment as a whole.
In the discussion that follows, we begin with a detailed analysis ofwhat the
system does and why social security faces the problems it does. Most people
are not aware of the magnitude of the system's unfunded liabilities, and
believe that the system is in trouble because of the baby-boomers and the
lack of wage growth to generate needed tax revenues. While these do playa
role, they are only part of the reason that benefits are projected to exceed
the financing, under the intermediate-eost estimate. In fact, much of the
burden facing future taxpayers can be explained by the substantial transfers
granted to several generations covered under the program during the start-
up phase, just as is often done in private pension plans. The burden of this
unfunded liability, and the interest required to pay for the debt, implies that
virtually all workers today anticipate very much lower net returns from the
system than did their parents and grandparents. The question therefore
becomes one of how this burden will be borne. Groups asked to carry part
of the load will be today's workers, today's retirees, and to some extent,
the workers of the future. How to allocate the burden, therefore, is at the
crux of the reform debate. While there is no single .'ight answer regarding
burden-sharing, we believe that discussions of reform options are bellel'
informed when these issues are discussed explicitly rather than obscured.
In the second and third sections of this book, we offer economic and
practical assessments of poten tial reform scenarios. One reason that policy-
makers may disagree about reform options is that they differ regarding how
reforms alter economic actors' behavior. Here several such behavioral re-
sponses are explored, including workers' retirement portfolio choices, re-
tirement patterns, employer layoff responses, and government investment
and risk-sharing patterns. Another reason that reformers disagree about
which reform would work best is that they consciously or implicitly disagree
about the criteria that should be used in judging reforms. To this end, we
provide a discussion of specific evaluation guidelines that help clarity points
of agreement, and make more evident important areas of disagreement in
thinking about specific reforms. The book's last section reports special con-
cerns of specific stakeholder groups, as they contemplate alternative plans
for social security reform.
Before proceeding with a more detailed overview of the findings, we note
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that this discussion focuses on the government program providing cash
benefits to older retired and disabled workers, as well as to the survivors of
deceased and retired workers. We do not examine in detail the Medicare
program, which in the United States affords health care to those 65 and
older (and to long-tel'm disabled workers). While recognizing the impor-
tance of that benefit program and its projected financing difficulties, we
believe that repairing the Medicare structure must be dealt with in the very
short term. The problems of the nation's OASDI system must be solved with
a longer-term perspective.
The Size of the Social Security Problem
In order to judge the urgency of social security reform in the United
States, it is essential to have a clear idea of how the system arrived at its
current juncture, how the system's predicted insolvency according to the
intermediate-cost estimate can be measured, and what the size of the pro-
jected funding shortfall might be. Several demographic and economic
trends lie behind these projections, as pointed out by Stephen Coss. He
emphasizes that low fertility rates after 1965, longer life expectancies, and a
large group ofbaby-boomers projected to attain retirement age will produce
a relatively small working age population supporting baby boom retirees.
Also, American workers' real pay has failed to rise significantly over the last
two decades due to productivity shortfalls, making tax collections grow less
quickly than previously forecast. Benefits have also been increased from
time to time under the social security program, and in 1975, annual auto-
matic cost of living adjustments were introduced (in 1977 these adjustments
were adjusted for what appeared to be over-indexing). Finally, employment
and life-style patterns have changed since the program was designed in the
1930s. Higher rates of divorce, job downsizing, and fewer skilled jobs have
made the prospects for retirement increasingly uncertain.
What will these trends mean for the future of the social security program?
Steven Kellison and Marilyn Moon show how future taxes and benefits un-
der current law are forecast, and estimate that, under current tax and bene-
fit rules, the combined OASDI Trust Funds will be exhausted around 2029,
according to agency intermediate-eost assumptions. In addition, they note
that these same Trust Funds will become a net collector from, rather than
contributor to, overall federal resources around 2020, disappearing by
2029. At that point tax revenues will be sufficient to pay only 75 percent of
scheduled benefits, with that ratio decreasing to about 66 percent by 2071.
This is in the context of a national shift in private pensions from defined
benefit to defined contribution plans, leaving many workers with low overall
replacement rates in retirement.
Both Coss and Kellison/Moon understand the limitations of these long-
range projections and acknowledge that problems arise in using them as the
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basis for policy formulation. One concern is that reforms to bring the fi-
nancing of the system into balance have important economic implications
for workers and retirees, potentially including tax increases and benefit
cuts. Another concern is that current policymakers may not be able fully to
anticipate the needs and priorities of future generations, making pel;odic
revisions in social security probably inevitable. Even with these caveats, how-
ever, the message is a gloomy one. The U.S. social security system is not in
balance, facing unfunded liabilities estimated at between $5 and $9 trillion
in present value terms, as shown by Coss. This debt, and the burden it
imposes on the economic system, cannot continue to grow inexorably. The
system must be reformed; the status quo cannot be maintained into the
indefinite future.
A map for progress in this discussion is offered by Joseph Quinn, who
provides severaj practicaJ criteria that can be used to evaluate alternative
social security reform proposals. Drawing on the work of the Technical
Panel on Trends in Income and Retil"ement Saving for the Advisory Council
on Social Security (which he co-chaired with Olivia Mitchell), Quinn points
out that the social security system has several competing goals. In addition,
he notes that the program has diverse and imperfectly understood interac-
tions with overall economic and social activities. Quinn's concern is that
behavioral responses to social security taxes and transfers might offset the
expected direct impacts of the program, at least in some cases. For example,
workers who anticipate high retirement benefit payments from social se-
curity would save less on their own, and retire somewhat earlier, than with-
out such a system. It is essential to factor these economic responses into a
cost-benefit analysis of any particular change in the system. Quinn also
believes that attention must be devoted to the transition mechanisms for
implementing program changes, since he foresees that these will dramat-
ically affect public understanding, confidence, and support for the system
that emerges from the reform fray.
Options for Social Security Reform
While diverse ways to reform America's social security system can be imag-
ined, it is useful to think of them in terms of three alternative "template"
approaches. One such template for reform is to cut benefits so as to live
within current tax rates; the second is to raise taxes in order to keep benefit
promises more or less untouched; and the third is to convert the present
system from a defined benefit to a defined contribution system.2 The reform
options offered by the last (1994-96) Advisory Council on Social Security
may be classified according to these templates. Thus the "Maintain Bene-
fits" (MB) plan preserved most current benefit promises while raising
taxes to pay for them (see the Appendix to this chapter). The second plan,
termed the "Personal Security Account" approach (PSA) by its inventors,
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cut government-provided benefits and instead provided a flat benefit to
all retired workers along with individually managed defined-eontribution
funded accounts. The third proposal. offered as a compromise plan, was
named the "Individual Account" plan (IA), where a small individual ac-
count would be married with a government-guaranteed benefit somewhat
smaller than current benefits. This does not exhaust the range of options,
since, as we shall show below. others have proposed cutting benefits by
means-testing them, or limiting social security payouts to those in dire eco-
nomic need.~
Despite the diversity of views over which reform to adopt, most U.S. pol-
icymakers do agree that a reform plan must ensure that the old-age system
has a solid financial footing for the long term. Further, most experts agree
that the "long term" should be thought about in terms of generations
rather than simply years or presidential terms; the 75-year perspective cur-
rently used for the social security system is generally seen to be about right.
Other areas of agreement include the view that social security reforms
should be enacted to ensure old-age security sooner rather than later. This is
because changes legislated now and implemented gradually into the future
will allow workers time to adjust their saving and retirement plans.
More controversy is generated over which of the specific reforms should
be implemented and how soon they should go into effect. As we shall show
below. part of the dispute stems from differences in evaluation objectives.
and part is attributable to the fact that reasonable people disagree about
economic and demographic projections 75 or more years into the future. In
our view, such disagreement is most productively narrowed by understand-
ing which alternative types of reform are technically feasible, and the impor-
tance oflikely economic and political behavioral responses to these reforms.
Assessing the Economic Impact of Social Security Reform
The second substantive section of the book offers an economic assessment
of specific social security reform proposals, in order to explore how given
reforms might affect both household and economy-wide behavior. Olivia
Mitchell,John Geanakoplos. and Stephen Zeldes launch the discussion with
a critique of several measures frequently offered to compare social security
outcomes under different reform scenarios. Specifically, money's worth
concepts such as the benefit to tax ratio, the internal rate of return, and net
present value are widely used to summarize the relationship between social
security participants' lifetime taxes paid and lifetime benefits received. The
authors argue that this may be appropriate under some circumstances, but
is not useful for comparing alternative social security systems-including
systems with privately managed individual accounts investing in equities.
The evidence also suggests that money's worth estimates are biased in favor
ofsocial security privatization because the measures often do not fully incor-
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porate effects of the transition costs; they often do not appropriately adjust
for either aggregate or idiosyncratic risk, both of which would rise under
privatization; and they do not account for changes in household behavior as
a result of the reform.
The likely pattern of returns potentially available for a PSA or lA ac-
cumulation account is studied by Gordon Goodfellow and Sylvester Schie-
ber. In simulation analysis, the authors show that no policy proposal, includ-
ing the Maintain Benefits plan, will be able to provide benefits consistent
with current rules unless substantially more new revenues are raised. They
then posit that a PSA or IA approach would probably see people investing
their retirement funds in diverse ways, and some additional cost would be
expended in administrative expenses. In the long term, they believe that
returns on contributions experienced in a PSA account can be quite high, if
the capital market performs in the future as it has in the past.
Another policy expert, Martin Holmer, also uses stochastic simulation to
model the interactions between social security and the broader economy.
This study is macroeconomic in spirit, seeking first to replicate the out-
comes in the nonstochastic, or deterministic, model that was used by the
Social Security Administration in assessing reform options for the Advisory
Council. He then goes on to embed his program simulation in a larger
model of the economy, in order to explore whether policies'appear to have
different effects when macroeconomic consequences are taken into ac-
count. Holmer estimates the impact of various reforms on national saving,
and concludes that GOP would be substantially higher under a system where
individual accounts (lA or PSA) were invested in capital markets.
Ofcourse, equity investment need not be restricted to privately held indi-
vidual accounts, as noted in Kent Smeuers's study of investing the social se-
curity trust funds in equities. This idea, introduced initially by supporters of
the MB plan, has captured the attention of many in the policy arena. A key is-
sue, as Smetters points out, is how risk is transferred intergenerationally, due
to variation between expected and actual results ofTrust Fund investments.
Are retirees at risk for capital market fluctuations, or will future workers
have to pay higher taxes in times of depression? The answers to these ques-
tions are crucial in determining the nature of risk pooling across and within
generations. The author also acknowledges some of the difficult governance
and political issues that would arise if the government used politically moti-
vated inclusion or exclusion rules, or if certain stocks were included or
excluded from the index fund in which governmen t monies were invested.
This discussion leads naturally to the more general topic that is of special
interest to George Pennacchi, who explores the relationship between pri-
vate retirement saving and government retirement guarantees for pension
systems. Drawing on international experience, the author discusses how to
model and value government guarantees for retirement income, similar to
those provided by other governments in many parts of the world. He uses
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contingent claims analysis, or option pricing theory, to value defined bene-
fit as well as defined contribution pension guarantees. This is particular
useful in Chile, for instance, where the government guarantees a minimum
retirement income to participants in the mandatory private pension system.
Even though people hold private assets in their individual accounts, this
government-guaranteed return turns out to be worth many times salary for
a low-paid employee (and less than a year's pay for a highly paid employee).
Clearly guarantees of this sort can dramatically alter the incentives to partici-
pate in a defined-eontribution individual-account type system and not to
comply fully with the coverage rules, and they also influence the fiscal cost
of individual-account type pension reforms.
Much public opinion tends to favor cutting benefits for the wealthy,
rather than uniform ac.'oss-the-board reductions for everyone. Hence the
interesting study by David Neumark and Elizabeth Powers explores the po-
tential effects of means-testing social security benefit amounts, by drawing
on evidence from other programs that do implement a means test. Their
specific focus is on the Supplemental Security Income program, from which
the authors conclude that means testing will induce less work prior to old
age. There may be some negative effect on saving rates as well.
Reformers of social security benefits and taxes must also anticipate possi-
ble employer responses. In his study, Robert Hutchens asks how social se-
curity changes might alter the structure and intent of corporate retirement
policy. Hutchens views social security benefits as a form of early-retirement
program, financed by a non-experience-rated tax. Against this backdrop,
employers structure their employment policy toward older workers, be-
havior somewhat akin to that seen in unemployment insurance. Hutchens's
stylized model shows how companies hit with adverse demand shocks will
tend to downsize older workers in bad times, with social security benefits
cushioning this transition. The implication of his model is that social se-
curity benefit cuts and payroll tax increases could reduce the demand for
older workers. While the results are suggestive rather than empirically con-
clusive, the study does point to some as yet unexpected responses to system-
wide changes in social security.
Political and Practical Considerations
The thit'd section of this book reports on how various stakeholder groups
might react to the proposed social security reforms. One practical issue that
must be confronted by all social security reformers is that of system non-
participation, or more bluntly, payroll tax evasion. Other countries have a
difficult time ensuring that eligible employers and workers actually partici-
pate in their national social security systems, particularly in Latin America
and Eastern Europe. While this topic has not warranted much attention in
the United States thus far, it will in the future: researcherJoyce Manchester
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points out that one-quarter of American taxpayers admit underpaying their
taxes at some point. Her review indicates that social security reforms will be
more successful when payroll taxes are lower, benefits are linked more
closely to taxes paid, and the number of tax brackets is reduced.
Likely employer responses to social security reform are taken up in the
chapters byJanice Gregory and Christopher Bone. Gregory shows how em-
ployer pensions have evolved alongside social security over time, a joint
evolution process that suggests to her that companies will change their
retirement offerings in tandem with changes in social security. One predic-
tion is that if social security benefits were to be reduced, overall retiree
benefits would fall since many employers would not be able to make up the
difference. If social security taxes were raised to finance existing benefit
promises, she predicts that this labor cost increase could curtail employ-
ment and would even induce some companies to provoke earlier retire-
ment. If the OASDI program were to move toward an individual-account
model, Gregory believes that companies would then be urged by their
workers to return to the defined benefit pension model, in contrast to
current trends. Some important reactions would be automatic due to for-
mal integration of pension and social security benefits, and in other cases
wages might fall if social security taxes Wel"e to rise. Bone's chapter is a
companion piece outlining additional research needed regarding potential
employer responses. Drawing on his actuarial background, Bone empha-
sizes the tremendous diversity and detail inherent in private pension plan
benefit and contribution formulas. While some may be tempted to dismiss
the importance of these plan design features, he hypothesizes that they will
induce plan sponsors to adapt differently to social security changes. In addi-
tion, public and private pension plans are governed by a different regula-
tory construct, which in turn affects how these costs will be spread among
the relevant stakeholders.
Employee groups are also worrying about prospects for social security
reform, as is made clear in the chapter by David Blillstein. Drawing from
historical evidence, he posits that organized labor groups would react quite
negatively to far-reaching changes in the nation's OASDI system. Many
union representatives would tend to oppose a model for social security in
which workers are given the responsibility to invest for themselves in individ-
ually held accounts. This is because employers and the nation as a whole are
perceived to be inherently better able to bear capital market risk and pool
longevity risk than are individual workers and theil" families. For this reason,
among others, American organized labor tends to favor reforms that stabi-
lize the system by improving system revenues, rather than by cutting benefits.
Risk of a related sort is the focus of Karen Holden's analysis, in which she
argues that individual account programs run the risk of undercutting the
insurance aspect of social security for older widows. Her research shows that
women, as compared to men, still earn less, have fewer years in the wage
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labor market, and live longer in t'etirement. Thus older women run a
greater than average risk of falling into old-age poverty, a risk that would
potentially be exacerbated by social security reforms that emphasized indi-
vidual accounts. As a result, Holden point~ out, the debate over social se-
curity benefit cuts or tax increases critically affects how women will be
treated by the reformed system as wife and widow beneficiaries. In her
analysis, she explores not only what social security changes might help the
plight of poor widows, but also evaluates changes in company pensions that
might ease their condition.
Years of experience in the pension arena at Fidelity afford Robert Pozen a
special vantage point in the analysis of individual social security account~.
His chapter emphasizes the importance of rules that will affect the balance
between individual control, risk impact, compliance levels, and administra-
tive costs. Should social security move to a defined contribution format,
several alternative formats might be permitted, and Pozen notes some of
their strengths and weaknesses. He recommends adopting several regula-
tory and legal constructs developed for private pension plans under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), including, for exam-
ple, requiring a provider to offer at least three investment pools,
Economic issues are not the only factors influencing the social security
reform environment, a point brought home by John Rother and William
Wright. They review data from several recent public opinion polls con-
ducted for the American Association of Retired Persons, asking people
about their preferences regarding the current social security system as well
as possible changes in the system. Perhaps the most striking conclusion from
their data is how confused people seem to be about social security and their
own retirement prospects, We know from other sources that Americans are
undersaving, yet the AARP polls indicate that many people believe they will
not need the national social security system in retirement. This may simply
be the flip side of the finding that national confidence in the OASDI system
has dropped by a quarter between 1985 and 1996, from 46 percent to 35
percent. The evidence also shows that many of the reforms under active
discussion are unpopular. For example, two-thirds of poll respondents op-
posed raising the normal retirement age to age 70, and about the same
fraction opposed raising the payroll tax to meet current benefit promises.
By contrast, benefit cuts were favored by many, particularly if the cuts were
targeted at the high-income elderly (where the "high income" group was
typically defined as people wealthier than the survey respondent!).
Risk Spreading into the Future
To preserve old-age security for current and future retirees, the nation's old-
age system must be reformed soon, As we shall demonstrate in what follows,
specific proposals differ in terms of how and for whom benefits will be cut,
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how and for whom taxes will be raised, and whether a private account
should be included - and, if so, how large to make this account. Possible
responses of economic players are diverse and sometimes undesirable.
Those who have a stake in the outcomes are many, including individual
workers and retirees, the family, employers, all generations alive today, and
additional generations into the future.
But despite these complexities, and irrespective of which reform plan is
chosen, any reform plan will ultimately involve allocating risk across dif-
ferent members and groups in society. The form and structure of the re-
structured social security system that emerges for the future will therefore
determine who ends up bearing which types of risk; in the end, the risk of a
complex, globally interdependent, and aging society may never be com-
pletely avoided or eliminated.
Appendix: An Overview of the Advisory Council
Proposa's4
The 1994-96 Advisory Council on Social Security consisted of persons rep-
resenting business and labor (3 members each), the self-employed (I repre-
sentative) and the public (5 members), and was chaired by University of
Michigan economics professor Edward Gramlich. Rather than issuing a sin-
gle recommendation, the panel proposed three alternative models for so-
cial security reform.
The first plan, known as the Maintenance of Benefits (MB) plan, was
championed by Robert Ball, a former Commissioner of Social Security, and
five other members. This plan intended to keep in place the currently
legislated schedule of benefits, including raising the normal retirement age
to 67. Revenues needed to pay for the benefits would come from (i) addi-
tional federal income taxation of social security benefits and the diversion
to the OASDI Trust Fund of the income tax receipts on benefits currently
supporting Medicare; (ii) a 1.6 percentage point increase in the combined
employer-employee payroll tax rate in the year 2045; and (iii) the allocation
of up to 40 percent ofTrust Fund reserves to the equity market, which in the
past enjoyed a higher rate of return than government bonds. This proposal
envisioned no individual accounts and some benefit cuts beyond those al-
ready legislated.
The second proposal, known as the Individual Accounts (IA) plan, was au-
thored by Chairman Gramlich and Marc Twinney. This plan would cut bene-
fits for middle and high wage workers through changes in the benefit for-
mula, and index the normal retirement age to changes in longevity. It would
also boost payroll taxes by 1.6 percent ofcovered payroll to finance a small in-
dividual defined contribution account. System participants would be per-
mitted limited investment discretion over the funds, which could be invested
under the auspices of a government licensed and managed mutual fund. At
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age 62, retirees could claim an indexed annuity, based on the total accumu-
lation in the account; the funds could not be withdrawn in a lump sum.
The third proposal, named the Personal Security Account (PSA) pro-
posal, was developed by Sylvester Schieber and Carolyn Weaver. This model
would replace the current social security defined benefit plan with a two-
tiered system, where the first tier would pay all participants a flat benefit
independent of earnings histories, thus annulling the defined-benefit na-
ture of the OASDI system. This flat payment would be worth about $410 per
month (in $1996), an amount about two-thirds of the poverty level for an
elderly individual, and similar to a low-wage worker's social security benefit
today. (Pro-rated first-tier benefits would be paid to those with 10-34 years
of coverage.) The second tier would consist of a mandatory personal retire-
ment account financed by a tax of 5 percent of payroll which would be a re-
assignment from the employee 6.2 percent tax rate; the account would be
managed by a licensed private investment house under the direction of the
plan participant. Accounts could be claimed at age 62." Under this model, a
significant unfunded liability from the old system would remain, requiring
additional revenues equal to about 1.5 percent of covered payroll over the
next 72 years.
Despite their differences, all three proposals contained common ele-
ments, including the maintenance of a mandatory, universal, public social
insurance program with retirement, survivors, and disability benefits. They
all envisioned a progressive benefit structure, with net transfers toward
those with low earnings. Each involved additional taxation of social security
benefits, with the eventual inclusion of all social security benefits (in ex-
cess of contributions already taxed) in taxable income. All recommended
mandatory social security coverage of new state and local government
employees.
All three plans also favored the provision in present law raising the nor-
mal retirement age to 67, and two plans (lA, PSA) would have further
indexed it to longevity. None of the plans proposed means-testing benefits
or indexing social security benefits at rates lower than the cost ofliving. All
three plans eliminated the forecast 75-year social security imbalance, and all
three went beyond this to stabilize the ratio of the Trust Fund reserves to
annual expenditures between 2050 and 2070, the last two decades of the
current planning horizon. Finally, all three plans relied on private sector
investments to generate additional revenues for future retirees or for the
OASDI program as a whole.
Notes
1. These concepts are discussed at more length in Mitchell (1988).
2. In this third case, of course, it is likely that benefit cuts and tax increases would
still be needed to reach system solvency. See Goodfellow and Schieber, (this volume).
Olivia S. Mitchell, Robert J. Myers, and Howard Young I 5
3. Other reform options include one by the Committee on Economic Develop-
ment (CED 1997), which is perhaps best characterized as a plan halfway between the
IA and the PSA plans. See also Carter and Shipman (1996).
4. This section is derived from Quinn and Mitchell (1997).
5. The PSA plan also advocated increasing the normal retirement age.
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